Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman�s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career. [Part I of X]Medical Pension Board reviewed the entire matter and denied Fuhrman’s application for disability pension. The Board considered the medical evidence and concluded that Fuhrman’s conditions did not preclude him Fuhrman entered the Police Academy on August 4, 1975, and graduated on December 19, 1975. Fuhrman’s assignments during his first five years of employment were somewhat unusual in that he was assigned to four different commands, 77th Street (twice), Hollenbeck, OCB CRASH, and Central Patrol Divisions. All four commands would be considered “active” especially for an officer assigned to gang suppression. It’s interesting to note that the longest he stayed anywhere during this period was about 1½ years.In May of 1981, he was transferred to Traffic Coordination Section (TCS); however, the majority of that time involved he efforts to obtain a disability pension. Initially, the City denied Fuhrman’s claim for medical disability pension. It must be remembered that at this time (early to mid 1980’s) the City was experiencing a glut of psychological disability claims by police officers. Rules governing such claims where being tightened and public policy was enacted to prevent meritless claims from allowing able-bodied police officers to obtain tax free lifetime pensions. Fuhrman appealed the City’s denial to the Worker’s Compensation Appeal Board and, in its ruling of April 23, 1982, they issued Fuhrman retro-active award granting him temporary disability effective August 8, 1981. However, on May 5, 1983, the from working full duty. They concluded that Fuhrman had exaggerated his condition and they accepted the opinion of several doctors that there was no work related disability. This ruling, in essence, put Fuhrman in the position of resigning from Department with no benefits or returning to work. Giving those choice, Fuhrman opted to return to work.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY. The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman�s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career. [Part II of X]Upon his return in May of 1983, Fuhrman was placed in the Temporarily Assigned Rehabilitated Personnel (TARP) program and assigned too TCS. At that time, TAP was used as a period of rehabilitation as well as an evaluation tool. Officers placed into TARP were evaluated by their supervisors as well as Behavioral Sciences Services Section (BSSS). Though many of the records for the period Fuhrman was in TARP are no longer available, it appears that his supervisors indicated that he was making a good transition back to police work. Further, BSSS concurred that he was making a good transition. Finally, on December 12, 1983, Fuhrman was transferred to WLA Patrol Division and assigned to full field duties.In the late 1980's the Department experienced a glut of probationary officers exceeding its usual compliment of Field Training Officers (FTO's). to compensate for this unusual situation, the City created the category of Temporary FTO to increase the FTO pool. Officers with ten or more years of service were automatically eligible for a Temporary FTO assignment. On December 4, 1988, Fuhrman was assigned as a Temporary FTO. (This would have been near the end of the Temporary FTO program.) As the program came to a close in early 1989, the Department tried to place Temporary FTO's into permanent FTO positions in order to avoid their downgrade from PIII to PII positions, a loss of 5 ½% in pay. Apparently, Fuhrman was the beneficiary of this program as he was placed into a PIII Detective Trainee position in WLA. Ten months later, he promoted to Detective and remains in WLA Detectives. At that time, Detective Trainees were allowed to remain in their Area of assignment upon promotion to detective. However, that was changed in 1994 and promotees are now required to change their Area of assignment. Fuhrman's upgrade to Detective II occurred in 1994 as the by-product of a grievance. The particular of that matter are confidential, as are all grievance, cannot be disclosed publicly.A search of Legal Affairs Division records as well as a search of court records by IAD investigators showed that Fuhrman was involved in seven civil suits during his career.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.[parts III and IV]A search of Legal Affairs Division records as well as a search of court records by the IAD investigators showed that Fuhrman was involved in seven civil suits during his career. (An eighth suit was identified initially, but it was discovered that another person with the same name was involved in that suit.) One of the suits involved Fuhrman’s seeking a pension and two others were for articles published about him during the Simpson case. Of the four remaining suits, the City only had records on one which involved Fuhrman’s on-duty conduct and in which the City was a defendant. Two of the suits also involved Fuhrman’s on-duty conduct, but the City had no record of those suits. The one remaining suit stemmed from Fuhrman’s off-duty employment; but because the City was not a defendant in that suit, current practice is that no record is kept. In fact, the Department had no knowledge that these last three suits even existed until this profile was developed. (This is addressed in the recommendation section later in this report.).Fuhrman was involved in one officer-involved shooting (OIS #43-87) which occurred on April 7, 1987. Fuhrman, along with 3 other officers of WLA’s Special Problems Unit were conducting a surveillance and observed a robbery-in-progress. The officers went in foot pursuit of one robbery suspect which culminated in an officer-involved-shooting by Fuhrman. (This incident resulted in a civil suit; but, Fuhrman never spoke about it in his interviews with McKinny.) The shooting was subsequently classified as in policy by the Chief of Police; however, training was recommended for some of the tactics. The Police Commission concurred with this finding.Fuhrman was present at another officer-involved shooting which occurred on April 24, 1986. In that incident, Fuhrman and his partner were working WLA patrol when they became aware that officers from West Traffic Division were in pursuit. The pursuing officers subsequently relinquished the pursuit to Fuhrman and his partner. At one point, the vehicle spun out and the officers exited their vehicle to arrest him. When the suspect attempted to drive over Fuhrman’s partner, his.(Fuhrman’s) partner became involved in an officer-involved shooting. Fuhrman did not fire his weapon. The final disposition of the shooting review was in policy, no action; tactics, training (OIS #53-86 which is discussed further in this report under Issue 24).In addition to conducting an administrative investigation whenever an officer uses force, the Department also conducts a thorough administrative review whenever a law enforcement activity related death (LEARD) occurs. An example of a LEARD would be someone dying while in custody or after an altercation with officers. Several years ago, those administrative investigations were expanded to include significant law enforcement related injuries (LERI). A search of the Department index for these events does not show Fuhrman as being involved in a LEARD or LERI. Currently, the Department index only captures the names of officers who had significant involvement in a LEARD or LERI and not those who had only a minor role. Therefore, it is possible that Fuhrman could have been a witness in one of those events in which case his name would not be captured in the index.The Department, as do most other law enforcement agencies, requires its employees to obtain a permit for off-duty employment. Those permits have been automated since 1993. The information resides on a stand-alone computer in Personnel Group and captures basic data such as the employee’s name, assignment, type of work, location and the company for which they are working. In order to obtain pre-1993 information, investigators hand-searched over 75 boxes of records in the City’s records retention system. No permits were found for Fuhrman from 1975Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.[part V]Starting in 1986, they found six one-day permits to perform security work at a variety of locations, mostly in West Los Angeles Area. In 1990, he obtained an annual permit to work security for a movie theater. There was no documentation found that this permit was renewed for the following year. As discussed earlier, it appears that Fuhrman was the defendant in a civil suit arising from his off-duty employment.REVIEW OF TAPES/TRANSCRIPTS On August 31, 1995, Laura McKinny appeared as a witness at the Simpson criminal trial. She testified that she had met Fuhrman at a Westwood restaurant in about February of 1985. At the time, McKinny was employed at UCLA as a learning skills counselor for high-risk athletes. Fuhrman, who was off-duty, initiated a conversation with her. During their conversation, Fuhrman identified himself as a police officer and agreed to be interviewed at a later time.A month or two later, McKinny telephoned Fuhrman at WLA Station and they agreed to meet for an interview. Between 1985 and 1994, McKinny formally interviewed Fuhrman 14 times. She testified that she tape recorded and afterwards transcribed the interviews. Excerpts from McKinny’s recordings of Fuhrman were played in open court. Some of those excerpts discussed Fuhrman’s allegation of systemic misconduct by officers of the LAPD. Prior to McKinny’s testimony, copies of the tapes and McKinny’s transcripts were provided to the Los Angeles County Deputy District Attorney who was prosecuting the Simpson case.Initially, McKinny would not allow the tape recordings or transcripts to be reviewed by the Department because she feared the information might be leaked to the public thereby reducing their value. In an effort to obtain access, the Los Angeles City Attorney’s Office filed a motion requesting access so the Department could investigate Fuhrman’s allegations of police misconduct. An agreement, in the form of a Protective Order, was reached and approved by the court in which McKinny agreed to allow City Attorney James Hahn to obtain one copy of the tapes and one copy of her transcripts from the District Attorney provided that Mr. Hahn maintained those items securely in his office. Further, Mr. Hahn agreed to allow only eight named members of the Police Commission and seven named members of the Department to review the tapes and transcripts under controlled circumstances. No other copies were to be made and, upon completion of any administrative hearings, the City agreed to return the tapes to McKinny. No disclosure of the tapes’ contents is allowed except as necessary for an effective personnel investigation or administrative hearing regarding police misconduct. In accordance with this agreement, no copy of the tapes or McKinny’s transcripts is contained in the supporting documentation for this investigation. In compliance with the letter and spirit of that Protective Order, the taped conversation between McKinny and Fuhrman are summarized in this document.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.[part 6]INVESTIGATION For control purposes, each of the 29 “issues” in which Fuhrman referred to police misconduct have been numbered. There were 17 issues which could not be correlated to any identifiable incident and 12 which were connected to an actual event. For summary purposes, the 17 unidentifiable issues were: Issue 7 (Beating at the end of a Pursuit); Issue 8 (False Arrest); 9 (Falsifying Evidence); 10 (Failing to Report Misconduct); 11 (Striking Suspect in Stomach); 12 (Post-OIS Party); 13 (Slapping a Suspect); 14 (False Arrest of Lawyer); 15 (Shooting of PCP Suspect); 17 (Kicking Suspects on Footbeat); 20 (Beating Gang Suspects); 21 (Beating Loitering Suspect); 22 (False Arrest of Kid from Berkeley); 23 (Choking Suspect to Death); 25(Vandalizing Women’s Gym); 26 (Inappropriate Comments to Citizen); and, 28 (False Arrest of Burglar).This section will provide information on each of the issues and, where they could be connected to an event, a summary of the investigation and disposition of the allegations of misconduct which arose from the issue. As stated earlier, the minimum 15 year time lapse stifled this effort as well as the inability to tell when Fuhrman was fictionalizing, embellishing or relaying events as he remembered them.Issue 1 - Delayed Medical Treatment (IAD #96-0057) Background Fuhrman talks about an officer-involved shooting wherein both an officer and suspect are shot. He goes on to say that a large policeman at the scene would not let paramedics treat the suspect until the suspect was dead.Investigation The IAD investigators located an officer-involved shooting (OIS) which occurred in 77th Street Area on April 7, 1977, involving Officers Tedford Severns and Robert Yarnall. Both Severns and a male suspect sustained gunshot wounds. Keep in mind, this occurred 20 years ago, so the only Department documentation located for this incident was Robbery-Homicide Division’s (RHD) Officer-Involved Shooting Report. All other Department records, including all 7701 Street Area records, relative to this issue have been destroyed in accordance with the Department’s records retention policy. Obviously, this shooting received extensive media attention at the time and it has been the subject of training throughout the law enforcement community. Many of the facts are already in the public domain.On April 9, 1977, Officers Ted Sevens and Bob Yarnall were working uniformed patrol in 77th Area. At about 1915 hours, they saw a 1972 Ford Thunderbird, which had been stopped at the curb, suddenly accelerate into traffic. The officers followed the Thunderbird for several blocks until both vehicles stopped for a red tri-light signal at McKinley Ave and Century Blvd. Suddenly, it appeared to the officers that the three men in the car were preparing to exit and flee on foot. The officers exited their vehicle and Yarnall (passenger) approached the right rear of the Thunderbird while Severns walked toward the driver’s side. Suddenly, the suspect Dean opened the door, pointed a handgun at Severns and fired two shots striking him in the torso. Yarnall, seeing the gun shots followed by Severns falling backwards, believed that his partner was “down.” Yarnall drew his service revolver and an exchange of gunfire occurred between Yarnall and Dean after which Dean fell to the street still clutching his weapon. Severns, meanwhile, crawled into the police vehicle and broadcast a help call. While in the car, Severns engaged the vehicle transmission causing the car to roll forward in order to distract Dean who was engaged in a shoot-out with Officer Yarnall. As the car rolled forward slowly, Dean fell to the street mortally wounded. The police car stopped when it bumped the Thunderbird. Dean lay on the ground between the two cars.While Yarnall held the other two suspects in the car at gun point, he ordered the first unit on scene to immediately transport Severns, who was shot in the chest and stomach, to a nearby hospital. As they did so, additional units arrived and took the remaining suspects into custody. Some of the first few officers to arrive pushed the police vehicle back so they could see Dean clearly. The officers saw that Dean had numerous gun shot wounds including a head wound.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.[parts 7-8-9-10]Dean was not moving or breathing and the officers believed he was dead. In accordance with Department policy in such cases, they handcuffed his hands behind his back and established a crime scene. When the rescue ambulance (RA) arrived, an officer on the crime scene perimeter would not let them enter the scene. A Fire Department supervisor (Battalion Chief) responded to the location and discussed the situation with an LAPD supervisor after which a paramedic was allowed to examine Dean and pronounced Dean dead.The 1996 investigation resulted in one allegation that an unknown officer unnecessarily delayed paramedics for the purpose of denying medical treatment to an injured suspect. Mark Fuhrman refused to be interviewed; however, the current investigation showed that he was never at this scene. He had been transferred to Hollenbeck Area two months before this incident occurred and we don’t know if he was even working that night. However, Hollenbeck is in Operations-Central Bureau and 77th Area is in Operations-South Bureau making it virtually impossible for Fuhrman to have been at the crime scene especially during the first few minutes.The LAFD personnel who staffed the RA that night were interviewed. One was a paramedic and the other was a firefighter. They recalled being denied access to the scene by a lone uniformed police officer. The paramedic could not recall why they were denied access or what was said. The firefighter recalled a uniformed officer asking them where they were going. They said they were going to examine the man on the ground and the officer responded, “No, you’re not.” They asked the officer why and he told them he did not want them entering the crime scene. The firefighter felt that the officer was making the excuse of the area being a crime scene to prevent them from treating the man. He could not articulate why he felt that way, but he never considered it to be misconduct. At the time, he thought the LAPD supervisor was taking care of it because the supervisor later asked the paramedic to try and point out the officer. The firefighter estimated that he was about ten feet from Dean. From the time he arrived, he saw no signs of life and believed that Dean was dead. The paramedic estimated that he was about 20 feet away and he did not remember if the man appeared to be dead or not. However, he did not see Dean exhibit any signs of life. They returned to the ambulance and the paramedic requested that a battalion chief respond to the scene. When the battalion chief arrived, they briefed him and he spoke to a police lieutenant who had just arrived at the location. Then, the paramedic was allowed to examine the man and determined that he had expired. The firefighter estimated that about ten minutes lapsed from their arrival to examination of the man and the paramedic put the lapse at about five minutes. Later, a police lieutenant asked them to identify the officer who had refused them entry; but, neither of them was able to find the officer. The paramedic could describe the officer only as a male Caucasian. The firefighter described him as a male, about six feet tall, 180 to 190 pounds, with dark hair. Neither of them could identify any of the officers from photos they were shown during this investigation.During his interview, the paramedic mentioned that he had completed a log entry for the incident. The IAD investigators obtained a copy of the log. The paramedic’s entry states that, when he and the firefighter arrived, the other two suspects were on the street next to the vehicle. They appeared uninjured and were handcuffed. His log states that, “Officer [redacted] STD (stated) area was sealed off & prohibited R/A personnel to approach injured PT (party).” The paramedic then requested Battalion Chief 13 to respond. Upon arrival, Battalion Chief 13 spoke to the OIC, a lieutenant, who permitted them to examine the man. The paramedic’s log says that an LAPD officer had been shot and that, when he (Paramedic) arrived, the situation was “confused and tense—Officer [redacted] was apparently acting on orders to seal off scene of shooting to prevent disturbing evidence.” (The redacted name is the same person throughout this section.)The paramedic was re-interviewed and shown his log entry to see if it would refresh his memory. However, he repeated essentially the same information as his first interview. The log did help him recall that he received the call at 1920 hours, arrived at 1922 hours, pronounced the suspect dead at 1935 hours and left the scene at 1958 hours. It also helped him recall that the officer who stopped him was about his size. The paramedic is just over six feet tall and he said that he would remember if the officer was taller than he. He wrote the name “[redacted]” in his journal, but cannot recall now why he wrote that name in his journal. He recalled that [redacted] provided him information, but he did not recall if [redacted] prevented them from entering or told them the scene was secured. He recalled needing someone to talk to for information and he believed that [redacted] gave him that information.The LAFD Battalion Chief was interviewed; but, he had no recollection of the incident nor did he recall being requested to the scene by the paramedics about a conflict between police and fire department personnel. He reviewed his journal entry, but still had no recollection of the incident. His journal entry simply noted that, at 1920 hours, he responded to a “R/A requesting assistance” call at the scene of an OIS with a wounded officer. It said nothing about a conflict. The coroner who performed the autopsy on Dean is now deceased. Dr. Rogers, the current Chief of the Coroner’s Forensic Medicine Division, reviewed the autopsy report completed by the doctor. Rogers opined that a delay of five to fifteen minutes would not have affected the result for Dean because Dean had received many wounds that were fatal including a wound that involved the aorta which would have caused death within two to five minutes. As a result of that wound, a person would become unresponsive immediately and the heart would stop within a minute. Dean had many wounds that could have produced “a sucking sound,” which would only have lasted a few seconds. Wound number one, a head wound, may or may not have produced a seizure and, if it did, it would only do so if the person was alive. The body fluids would only exit the body if the person was alive or if gravity played a part. To the layman, the lack of movement would not indicate death, the person could be unconscious. The lack of bleeding would indicate death because a person with numerous gunshot wounds who was alive would bleed profusely. Of the 14 gunshot wounds, four were life threatening. It was his opinion that, if the incident occurred and medical treatment (doctors and equipment) was on the scene, the person would not survive with the amount of injuries (14 gunshots) shown in the autopsy. Rogers concluded that a delay of 5 to 15 minutes for paramedics to examine Dean would not have made a difference.Officers Tedford Severns and Officer Bob Yarnall (retired) were interviewed, but had little information relative to this allegation. Severns was taken from the scene almost immediately. Yarnall was transported from the scene shortly afterward. Neither of them was at the scene when the paramedics arrived. Both of them have discussed this incident many times since it occurred and Severns has discussed it at classes he has taught at the Academy. Neither of them has ever heard that paramedics were denied access so Dean would die. Ironically, Severns transferred to Hollenbeck Area CRASH several years later and worked with Fuhrman. They have discussed various parts of the shooting such as tactics, wearing a ballistic vest and mental preparedness. But, they never discussed preventing paramedics from treating the suspect.Officer [redacted] and his partner responded to the help call and started to set up the crime scene. The partner thought he set up crime scene tape to secure the area and then worked crowd control around the southwest corner of the crime scene until investigators arrived. He had no idea how long they were at the scene, but guessed it was a few hours. He did not recall any contact with the paramedics, though he recalled them being at the scene. He never saw or heard of a paramedic having a problem with an officer who was protecting the immediate crime scene and he never prevented the paramedic from treating the suspect. [Redacted] recalls that his partner walked to the crime scene while he finished parking the car. [Redacted] saw two paramedics exit their RA, so he pointed them toward the crime scene. He stayed by his car and performed crowd control duties. He never went to the actual scene. After about 15 minutes, they were sent to the hospital to find out how Severns was doing. They stayed at the hospital for about 15 minutes, then returned to their division and resumed normal patrol. Later on, they drove by the crime scene. The area was sealed off and investigators were on the scene. He did not delay the paramedics and he did not see any other officer deny them access. He has never heard anyone talk about officers delaying the paramedics.The first sergeant at the scene stated that he immediately attempted to gain control of a “confused” situation. He knew that Severns had been shot and was transported to the hospital. He also knew that one suspect was shot. The suspect was lying on the ground between the Thunderbird and the officers’ police vehicle. The suspect appeared to be dead and he showed “absolutely” no signs of life. He saw a large amount of evidence, possible shell casings, on the ground next to the suspect and both vehicles. To preserve the evidence, he directed officers to move back and secure the crime scene so the evidence would not get “trampled.” He recalled directing an officer he described as a “great big tall guy” to secure the sceneFuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman�s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.Finally, the paramedic's handwritten log indicates that a period of 13 minutes passed between the arrival of the paramedics and pronouncement of death. All other records have been destroyed, so there are no documents detailing exactly what transpired during that 13 minutes. The lack of official records still in existence makes it impossible to verify times. The paramedic examined the body prior to pronouncing death, but we don't know how long his exam took. It is also unclear whether the crime scene was controlled when the paramedics first arrived or if they had to wait for the additional suspects to be taken into custody and the car cleared. Everyone agrees that it was understandably chaotic. The battalion chiefs log shows him receiving the call at 1920 hours and the paramedic, 19 years later, estimated that the chief arrived at 1929 hours. Theparamedic estimated the delay was about five minutes, the firefighter estimated it at 10 minutes, and the sergeant said it was 30 seconds. Finally, there is no indication from the paramedics, in their statement or log, to suggest that either of the large officers, whose physical appearance would seem memorable, caused the delay.It appears that Dean was dead within moments of being shot. Dr. Rogers, the current Chief of the Coroner's Forensic Medicine Division, reviewed the autopsy report and noted that Dean had received many wounds that were fatal including a wound that involved the aorta which would have caused death within two to five minutes. It was his opinion that, if the incident occurred and medical treatment (doctors and equipment) was on the scene, the person would not survive with the amount of injuries (14 gunshots) shown in the autopsy. Rogers concluded that a delay of 5 to 15 minutes for paramedics to examine Dean would not have made a difference.Clearly, there was a delay in allowing the paramedic to examine Dean and pronounce death. However, the Department Manual does recognize that an officer can pronounce death when a person is obviously dead. The sergeant was a very experienced field officer and, from close proximity, he concluded that Dean was dead. The coroner supports that opinion. Though it certainly would have been preferable for a paramedic to examine Dean and pronounce death, the delay was clearly unintentional and did not affect the outcome at all. In contrast to Fuhrman's rendition of an event he didn't witness, there was absolutely no evidence to support a conclusion that any officer delayed paramedics for the purpose of denying medical treatment to an injuredsuspect.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.Issue 2 - Beating in Hollenbeck O[AD #78-1096)BackgroundIn two different conversations, Mark Fuhrman talked about two Hollenbeck officers who were ambushed in the Pico-Aliso Housing Projects. Both of these conversations occurred in April of 1985. Specifically, he talked about grabbing a girl by the hair and using her as a shield while holding a gun to her head. Then, he threw her down the stairs and beat the four suspects until their faces were "just mush. He said that each of the suspects received numerous broken bones and one of them died. When the beating was over, the room and the involved officers were covered with blood.InvestigationClearly, in both of these conversations Fuhrman was discussing an officer-involved shooting (OIS) which occurred in 1978 in Hollenbeck Area. The incident received extensive media coverage as well as post-OIS coverage of community unrest relative to the policing of Pico-Aliso. Additionally, several claims for damages have been filed against the City relative to this incident as well as several law suits. Therefore, a great deal of the information on this issue is already in the public domain.On November 18, 1978, at 0040 hours, Officers Andersen and Brinker were working uniformed patrol in Hollenbeck Area. They were patrolling the area of 5th and Clarence Streets which is at the southern end of Pico-Aliso. (This was the same location of a prior officer-involved shooting which occurred on August 19, 1969. In the 1969 incident, Officer Maddox was shot and killed.)The officers saw at least six or more male Hispanics congregating in a parking lot and stopped their car to observe them. Two of the males (Arturo P. and Joe P.) ran toward the officers and, from about 25 feet away, threw two beer bottles at the police car. That was followed by several more thrown bottles from various directions. Arturo and Joe ran away as the rest of the group scattered in various directions. The officers drove behind Arturo and Joe following them to 5th and Pecan where they requested back-up and confronted Joe. They took Joe into custody and placed him in their car. Then they saw Arturo enter the rear door of a residence. As they went to take Arturo into custody, Brinker became involved in an altercation with Juan R. While Brinker struggled with Juan, a hostile crowd formed and Andersen attempted to hold them back.Suddenly, shots were fired by an unknown person in the crowd and Andersen was struck twice in the back during the initial gunfire. Andersen turned toward the sound of the shots and saw that the suspect was now shooting at Brinker who was also struck by gunfire along with Juan, the man with whom he had been struggling. An officer-involved shooting occurred after which the officers broadcast an "Officer needs help, officer down" call and requested an ambulance. With that, numerous officers from Hollenbeck and surrounding divisions responded to the scene. Numerous people were detained as possible witnesses and transported to Hollenbeck Station for questioning. That night, 13 arrests were made for various charges. The arrestees included eight males—five adults and three juveniles—who were arrested for assaulting Brinker and Andersen. However, the follow-up investigation failed to show that any of those eight people were directly responsible for wounding either officer. Two separate investigations were initiated that night, the criminal investigation which was handled by Robbery-Homicide Division's (RHD) Homicide Special Section and the OIS administrative investigation which was handled by RHD's Officer-Involved Shooting Team.Though no allegations of misconduct were made that night, it soon became apparent to the Hollenbeck Area Commanding Officer that a community activist was holding meetings in the community and appeared to be soliciting complaints relative to the shooting incident. The captain had prior contacts with the man and knew that he was an attorney with a community legal center. Most of the captain's contacts dealt with the man's many efforts to speak out against alleged police abuse. A few days after the OIS, the captain held several meetings with the man, other officials from the law center and residents from Pico-Aliso to determine the nature of their complaints. During those meetings, some of which were covered by a local television station, none of the residents came forth with any specific complaints relative to the shooting. However, on November 28, 1978, ten days after the shooting, approximately 30 residents of Pico-Aliso came to Hollenbeck Station. Thirteen people alleged misconduct against several officers. Each person was interviewed that night and a personnel complaint was initiated (IAD #78-1096). The complaint was investigated by IAD.The original complaint contained 36 allegations of misconduct against 14 officers. Thirty of the allegations were against Hollenbeck officers and six of the allegations were against officers from other commands. The 36 allegations involved a wide variety of locations including various locations in Pico-Aliso, at Hollenbeck Station, at the jail and in cars transporting complainants from one of those locations to another. Ultimately, only one allegation from the entire complaint was sustained against an officer assigned to Jail Division who received a ten-day suspension for improper tactics. The remainder of the allegations were classified as either Not Sustained (now Not Resolved), Unfounded, or Exonerated.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.In order to assess the credibility of Fuhrman's statements, which is the matter to be addressed in this issue, a supplemental investigation to the original personnel complaint was initiated. This facilitated utilization of material contained in the original investigation as well as a companion of the three administrative inquiries into this matter: 1) The officer-involved shooting report 2) The original personnel investigation 3) The IAD Supplemental Investigation Report for Phases I and II, It was not the intent or purpose of the supplemental investigation to re-investigate every allegation made in 1978. Many of those allegations were unrelated to Fuhrman's comments such as the allegation against the jailer. Therefore, only those 1978 allegations related to Fuhrman's comments were included in the supplemental investigation. Using that criteria, it was discovered that six of the original allegations alleged misconduct against five officers for their activities inside Albert M.'s residence that night. Those allegations were:
Allegation No. 7: Complainant Albert alleged that, after several officers entered his residence, an unknown officer directed an improper remark to him and the other occupants by stating, "You better get your goddamn ass down here."Allegation No. 8: Complainant Albert alleged that an officer entered his bedroom and, without cause, struck him once on the face with his hand and once with a revolver.Allegation No. 9: Complainant Albert alleged that after he was pushed from his bedroom into the hallway, several unknown officers struck him in the groin and on his upper body in an unknown manner; grabbed him by his legs and attempted to throw him down a stairway; held him by his upper arms and pulled him down the stairs, dragging his feet; and, struck him on the back of the head with a flashlight or baton.Allegation No. 10: Complainant Benny alleged that when he came down the stairs of his residence, an unknown officer, without cause, struck him in the right side with a hard object; as he walked out the front door, a second unknown officer pushed him from behind causing him to fall; and, a third unknown officer handcuffed him and unnecessarily shoved his head down on the ground.Allegation No. 11: Complainant Victor alleged that when he walked out of an upstairs bedroom, an unknown police officer unnecessarily grabbed him by the back of his head and pushed him to the floor. While on the floor, unknown officers, without cause, struck him with their fists and kicked him on various parts of his body.Allegation No. 36: Complainant Albert alleged that unknown officers ransacked his entire house damaging his furniture and clothing.The Fuhrman Task Force investigators audited the 1978 investigation and reviewed the OIS report as well as the crime and arrest reports relevant to this issue. They determined that Martha, the only female in the room that night, was not interviewed during the 1978 investigation because she could not be located. Given Fuhrman's statements regarding using a female as ashield and throwing her down the stairs, it was critical that she be located and interviewed. The investigators finally located her and they interviewed her in November, 1995.During the supplemental investigation, IAD investigators received a copy of the Claim for Damages filed by Albert, Benny and Michael subsequent to the public revelation of Fuhrman's remarks. Albert and Benny's claims contained information relative to this issue. Albert agreed to be re-interviewed and that was done in November, 1995. However, Benny refused to be re-interviewed. Michael was not present when the relevant events occurred on November 18, 1978. Therefore, with respect to this issue, all five people who were inside the Morales residence that night have been interviewed.In his 1978 statement, Albert stated that he was asleep inside his residence when the officers entered. Albert, wearing only a T-Shirt and undershorts, attempted to find a pair of pants to wear. Before he could find his pants, he saw an unknown officer holding a handgun enter his bedroom which was very dark. He described the officer as a male Caucasian, 30 years old, 5'8" to 5'9", 165 to 175 lbs, stocky build and wearing a uniform. Albert raised his hands to about shoulder level to show he did not have any weapons in them. As soon as the officer saw him with his hands raised, the officer struck him once on the right side of his face with his right hand which held the gun. He believed that the officer's hand, not the gun, made contact with his face. The officer used his left hand to push Albert's head back and struck him a second time with the handgun. The second blow landed on his face above the right eyebrow. He was sure that the gun struck him because he immediately felt blood run down his face. The officer then pushed him from the bedroom into the upstairs hallway. There were about four other officers in the hallway which was dark. As Albert walked toward the staircase to go downstairs, an unknown officer struck him in the groin area. Several additional unknown officers then struck him about the upper body with their fists and he fell to the floor. As he fell he struck the right side of his face against the wall. (This is where blood was found later in the SID photographs.) As he lay on the floor, an unknown officer placed his foot on his back to keep him from getting up. Other officers continued to strike him numerous times as he lay on the floor. As he was struck, he heard the officers state, "Come on man, it's my turn." An unknown officer grabbed him by the legs and attempted to "throw" him down the stairs. He braced himself and prevented the officer from doing that. Two officers grabbed him on each side by his arms and walked down the stairs with him, dragging his feet on the stairway. When he reached the bottom of the stairs, another officer struck him once on the back of the head with either a flashlight or baton. He did not recall being handcuffed; however, he was probably handcuffed at the bottom of the stairs before he was taken outside. He thought that he probably lost consciousness and did not know what happened to him once he reached the outside of his residence. He did not know if any officer pushed or shoved him to the ground. He did not know if anyone put their foot on his back or kicked him at that time. He was shown about 90 photographs of officers who responded to the shooting incident, but he could not identify any of the officers. Albert sustained a laceration over his right eye, bruises on his back and groin and a laceration on the back of his head. The injury to his groin resulted in complications and a subsequent operation. He was reinterviewed on November 21, 1995, but he had no additional information.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman�s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.In his 1978 statement, Benny stated that he was inside his residence when he heard gunshots and a few minutes later several uniformed and plainclothes police officers knocked loudly on the front door and stated, "Police Officers." Benny hesitated because he was not sure whether he should open the door. The officers then threatened to "shoot the door down if it was not opened." He still did not open the door, so the officers kicked it open. He had started up the stairway as the door was forced open. The officers shouted for him to come down the stairs. As he did so, he was struck in the right side with a flashlight or baton. He did not see the officer who struck him. He was then pushed out the front door by an unknown officer. When he reached the steps just outside his front door, he was pushed from behind by another officer. Benny lost his balance and fell to his knees. Another officer grabbed his arms, handcuffed him and shoved his head down on the ground. When the officers initially entered the residence, Benny did not hear them say, "You better get your goddamn ass down here." To the best of his knowledge they just told them to come down the stairs. He looked back toward his house and saw other officers bringing Martha and Victor outside. They were both handcuffed with their hands behind their backs. When they reached Benny's position on the lawn, they were made to lie face down near him. The officers then took him to an unmarked police car, sat him inside with two other people and closed the door. As the car was being driven away, he looked back and saw Albert lying on the lawn near their front door. He was handcuffed and dressed in T-Shirt and boxer shorts. There was blood on the shoulder area of his shirt, but Benny did not see any of the officers strike or kick his brother at that time. When they reached Hollenbeck Station, Benny was taken downstairs to the CRASH office. At about the same time, Albert was brought in. Albert's face and hair were caked with blood and blood was covering his T-shirt. Benny stated that his only injuries consisted of bruises and a "bloody nose."In his 1978 statement, Victor stated that he was also inside the residence when the officers entered. He was upstairs asleep in the same bedroom as Albert. Victor was awakened by the sounds of people shouting and then Martha entered the bedroom. A few seconds later, police officers came up the stairs and stood by the bedroom door. The officers told Martha to leave the room, so she did followed by Victor and then Albert. When he came out of the bedroom, an unknown officer grabbed him by the back of the neck and pushed him to the floor. Unknown officers then struck him with their fists and kicked him on the back of his upper body. He was struck and kicked numerous times. He could not describe the officers because it was dark inside the hallway. He believed one of the officers may have been in a business suit. He did not know how many officers were present. Victor may have lost consciousness from the kicks and punches and he did not know how he was handcuffed or taken downstairs. The next thing he realized, he was lying on the sidewalk that leads to the residence. While outside the residence, he saw two or three unknown officers remove Albert from the residence. Those officers were wearing business suits. They were holding Albert's feet and shoulders and were "dragging" him out the door. Albert's back and buttocks were touching the ground. The officers placed Albert on the front porch. Albert was bleeding from some unknown type of head injury. Blood covered his head and face. He did not know when Benny was brought out of the residence. Victor was placed in a police car with Martha and they were transported to Hollenbeck Station. In Jesus' 1978 statement, he said that he was inside the residence when the officers entered. He had been walking in the neighborhood when he heard gunshots. He immediately went to the residence to find his sister. When he entered, he observed Benny and Martha in the living room, but he did not see his sister. He heard someone say, "Open the door." Benny did not know whether to open the door; so, he told Benny not to open the door because they had not done anything wrong. He immediately went upstairs to a rear bedroom where he saw Albert asleep. Martha was also inside the room. At that time, he heard the front door being forced open. He looked down the staircase and saw three police officers standing in the doorway. One of the Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.Martha was the only female inside the residence when the officers entered. She was arrested, but not booked that night and she gave the detectives a phony address. The IAD investigators were unable to locate her during the 1978 investigation; however, they' did locate and interview her for the 1995 supplemental investigation. During her interview, she stated that her memory of the events may be imperfect. On the evening of November 17, 1978, she was walking home when she heard gunshots. So, she went to Albert's residence. Once inside, someone told her to go upstairs to the second floor of the apartment which she did. She could not recall who was inside the apartment, but she thought there may have been another female. There was a "commotion" inside the apartment and an unknown number of police officers entered and ordered all of the occupants outside. She could not remember specifically what the officers said when ordering everyone out. She could not recall how much time elapsed between the sound of gunfire and the entry of the officers. She could not recall where she was inside the apartment when the officers came in. The lighting inside the apartment was dim. An individual who had been asleep upstairs was brought out of the apartment by the officers. The male, whose identity she could not recall, was clad only in boxer shorts. Martha was not sure if the individual was brought out before or after her, but thought it was after her. Aside from the individual's lack of clothing, Martha did not recall anything unusual about his appearance. All of the occupants of the apartment, including Martha, were handcuffed and placed face down on the ground. She was transported, possibly by herself, to Hollenbeck Station. Once at the station, Martha kept to herself while other people were questioned. After being questioned, she was released. She did not recall seeing any blood inside the apartment, on apartment occupants or on the officers. She did not observe officers using a garden hose to clean themselves. During the interview, Martha was asked if she witnessed anything she thought was mistreatment on the part of police personnel. Martha stated no one was mistreated, but she felt degraded by being ordered into a prone position on the ground and her handcuffs were on too tight. She did not recall anyone, including herself, being escorted up or down the stairway at gunpoint while having their hair grabbed or pulled.Eleven neighbors and over forty officers were interviewed for the 1978 investigation. They each had relevant things to say regarding the entire complaint. However, none of them were inside the residence or saw what went on inside the bedroom. The first two officers at this scene, who were not accused officers, were interviewed in 1978. They saw three suspects, one of whom was handcuffed, run into the apartment. As other officers approached, they saw two suspects standing in an upstairs front window of the apartment. One of the suspects had an arm extended out the window as if he was holding a gun. The officers yelled a warning to the officers at the door that the suspect above them might have a gun. Numerous officers shouted for the suspect not to move. The suspect disappeared back into the apartment. As they continued to watch the upstairs window, one of the officers forced the front door open by kicking it. Approximately three or four CRASH officers entered the residence. These two officers maintained their position in the street and never entered the apartment. After a few minutes, an unknown officer inside yelled that everything was under control inside the apartment. An officer in uniform came out of the apartment, followed by another officer who had a suspect with him. The suspect was placed face down in a prone position on the grass near the sidewalk.Fuhrman... The L.A.P.D. InvestigationFuhrman Profile:The information contained in this profile was gathered from the Los Angeles Police Department Report of the MARK FUHRMAN TASK FORCE EXECUTIVE SUMMARY.The information contained in this profile represents Fuhrman’s contact with Department employees, suspects, citizens and other organizations throughout his career.The investigation disclosed that there were five officers inside the residence who took thesuspects into custody. (In compliance with 832. 7 PC, these officers are referred to as Officers 1 through 5 in this summary.)In his 1978 interview, Officer 1 stated that he was one of the plainclothes officers who entered the residence and arrested the occupants. Officer 5 approached the front door and knocked loudly several times while identifying himself as a police officer. There was no response from inside even though Officer 1 had seen someone at the upstairs window. After knocking on the door several more times, Officer 5 kicked the door and forced it open. A female at the top of the stairs was ordered to put her hands up and she complied by placing them over her head. She was told to come downstairs which she did and she was handed to officers outside. As they ascended the stairs, Officer 2 decided to get in front because he was carrying a shotgun. In the first bedroom Officer 1 felt for the light switch but the lights did not work. There were three male Latins in the bedroom. One was lying on a bed with a cover over him. Another suspect was standing in the west corner of the bedroom. He did not recall where the third person was at that time. Officer 1 ordered the man in the corner (Victor) to put his hands over his head. Instead of complying, the man yelled some unknown obscenities and assumed a boxer type fighting stance.Officer 1 holstered his revolver and approached the man. As he did so, the suspect turned and swung at him. At about the same time, other officers, including Officer 2, had approached the suspect who was on the bed to take him into custody. There appeared to be some resistance, but they could not see exactly what took place. As Officer 1 grabbed Victor, he swung at Officer 1 with one of his fists. Officer 1 placed a bar arm control on Victor and went onto the floor with him. He was then assisted by another unknown officer in handcuffing Victor. After Victor was handcuffed, Officer 1 believed that the other altercation was still in progress, although he could not see the details of it. After everything had subsided, he went outside with his arrestee. He believed they all left the house at approximately the same time. Officer 1 believed that there were at least two suspects in the upstairs bedroom. Those suspects were handcuffed inside the bedroom before being brought out. He had difficulty bringing his arrestee out because the arrestee continued to struggle. He believes that one of the other arrestees (Albert ) also continued to resist the officers as they brought him out of the house. He determined that there were approximately five officers in the upstairs bedroom. He denied committing any of the allegations in this complaint and did not see anyone else commit any of the allegations either.Officer 2 was interviewed in 1978. He was working with Officers 1 and 3 in plainclothes. He and Officer 5 kicked the door open after getting no response to repeated knocks and announcements. The apartment was dark inside however Officer 2 immediately saw a male Latin, 17 to 18 years old, standing on the staircase. He told the suspect to put his hands on top of his head and he complied. The suspect was then brought down the stairs and taken outside. Officer 2 continued into the apartment. Officer 1 and possibly Officer 4 stayed at the bottom of the stairs, guarding that area. Officer 2 and Officer 5 searched the downstairs area for additional suspects. They did not find any suspects so they returned to the bottom of the stairwell. Several officers, both inside and outside the apartment, were yelling at the unknown suspects upstairs, telling them to come down. At that time, a male and a female Latin came down the stairs with their hands up. They were escorted outside and handcuffed. Officer 2 went upstairs, followed by Officers 1, 4 5 and possibly Officer 3. At the top of the stairs, he heard the sounds of people moving around inside one of the bedrooms. Officers 1 and 4 guarded the door to that room as Officers 2 and 5 searched the other upstairs rooms, but no suspects were located. They returned to the bedroom door being guarded by Officers 1 and 4. Officer 2 held his flashlight and the forestock of the shotgun together in one hand, while he held the pistol grip of the shotgun with his other hand. He held the shotgun and flashlight in this manner so that light from the flashlight would be directed in the same direction that the shotgun was pointed. He stepped into the doorway and saw a male Latin (Albert ) standing about ten feet away facing him. He had his fists clenched and arms raised in a fighting stance. Officer 2 told the suspect to put his hands on top of his head and the suspect ignored him. The suspect repeatedly glanced to an area of the room which Officer 2 could not see. Officer 2 warned the other officers that there was someone else in the room. He crouched, stepped further into the room and turned to look to his left where he saw another man standing on top of a couch or bed with both fists clenched and his arms raised in a fighting stance. The suspect moved forward as if to strike Officer 2. Officer 2 used a front kick to kick the suspect once. The kick struck the male on the front thigh area, between the knee and the groin. He staggered back after being kicked. Officer 2 heard an unknown sound which caused him to look back to his right. He saw the first suspect moving toward him. The suspect had his hands raised and clenched. It appeared that the suspect was approaching to strike him from the rear. Officer 2 saw Officer 1 and possibly a uniformed officer move toward the suspect. Officer 2's attention returned to the suspect he had kicked. The suspect, with his hands still in a fighting position, was moving toward him again. Officer 2 struck the suspect once with the shotgun on the left side of his head. The trigger guard of the shotgun made contact with the suspect's head. The suspect staggered back, dazed, but did not fall to the floor. Officer 2 placed the side of the shotgun against the back of the suspect's head near the neck area and pushed the suspect to the floor. He knelt down and used his knees to pin the suspect to the floor. He was not sure, but believed that the male was handcuffed as he lay on the floor in the bedroom. When he stood up, Officer 2 saw numerous unknown officers in uniform in the upstairs hallway. He told them to take his arrestee to Hollenbeck Station. He did not give those instructions to any specific officer and did not know which officer actually took the suspect from the room. He remained inside the bedroom and did not see how the suspect was taken outside. He did not hear any sounds which would lead him to believe an altercation took place as the suspect was taken outside. He denied committing any of these allegations and did not see anyone else commit them either.
Officer 3 was one of the plainclothes officers who entered the residence and arrested the occupants. In his 1978 statement, he stated that he arrived just after the officers had forced the door open and were going inside. As he entered, he saw an unknown uniformed officer in the living room talking to a group of people there. The group appeared to be young females and children eight to ten years old. Officer 3 did not stop in the living room, he went upstairs. He saw that the lights were on in two of the bedrooms. He heard an altercation in the north bedroom and he entered that room. The room was completely dark. Upon entering the room, he saw Officer 4 against the west wall fighting a suspect. Another suspect was in the center of the room and appeared to be picking himself up or he was possibly involved in an altercation with one of the other officers. Officer 3 knew that Officers 1, 2, 4, and 5 were inside the room. He believed that one of the suspects was possibly standing on a bed located near the center of the room. Almost immediately upon entering the room, Officer 3 was struck on the upper part of his body and knocked down. He did not know whether he was struck by an officer or one of the suspects. The blow knocked him to his right rear and he fell by the doorway. He got up immediately and headed for where Officer 4 had been standing. He was struck again on some part of his upper body and fell again ending up in a closet. He possibly landed on his back as he fell. He immediately felt one of the suspects on top of him. It was possible that the suspect who landed on him was the same individual who knocked him into the closet. Believing that the suspect could have a gun, Officer 3 fought back in the darkness. He struck the suspect with his closed fist and also kicked at him from a reclining position on his back. The suspect was finally off of him and Officer 3 got onto his feet. He believed that one of the other officers probably took the suspect away. When Officer 3 got up, he knew that the suspect had already been taken out of the room. He believed one or two officers remained in the room with him. When he finally left the room, he did not see any of the suspects who had been in the room. There were no officers in the hallway outside of the room. He denied committing any of the allegations or seeing anyone else commit them.
In his 1978 statement, Officer 4 stated that he was one of the officers who entered the residence and arrested the occupants. He observed about four male Latins, one of whom was handcuffed, running and the three unhandcuffed ones run into the residence. Officer 5 knocked on the door and shouted, "Police, open the door." They received no reply from inside. Officer 4 heard running inside the apartment and heard a female voice. Officer 5 then forced the door open by kicking it. Officer 4 entered the residence along with several other officers. He had his gun drawn at that time. A male and female Latin were standing on the stairway. As they began walking downstairs, Officer 4 went to the kitchen to check the rear exit. He determined that none of the suspects had attempted to leave through that door and returned to the living room. At that time, the male and female suspects were being taken out of the house. He assumed they were taken outside and arrested. Officer 4 then went upstairs where he heard someone say, "Put your hands up." When he reached the top of the stairs, he went into a bedroom where he heard noises and saw Officer 2 attempting to restrain a male Latin suspect. Officer 4 reholstered his weapon. Officer 2 was attempting to place a bar arm control on the suspect. At that time, another male Latin approached Officer 2 from behind and grabbed him around the neck area. Officer 4 pulled the suspect off of Officer 2's back, shoved him to the floor and placed both knees on his back. Officer 4 was struck from the side by someone who could have been another officer or perhaps a suspect. He was knocked off the suspect to the side. He went back to the suspect he had previously attempted to control. He grabbed the suspect by the seat of his pants and shoved him out the door of the bedroom. As the struggle continued in the bedroom, he grabbed another male Latin in a semi bar arm control with one of his arms and pushed that individual out the door also. When the arrestees were taken out of the bedroom, other officers were standing just outside the doorway. Those officers took control of each arrestee as he was pushed out. Officer 4 could not reenter the bedroom at one point because the door was blocked. Within a few seconds, one or two additional suspects were brought out of the room. Officer 4 then determined that Officers 1, 2, 3, and 5 had all been inside the bedroom attempting to subdue the suspects. When the last two suspects were brought out of the room, Officer 4 observed that they were not handcuffed. They were no longer resisting and one of the suspects had blood on some part of his head. As the suspects were brought out, they were taken downstairs where Officer 4 believed they were handcuffed and taken away. He remained upstairs and checked the other rooms. They were vacant. Officer 4 later determined that Officer 1 sustained a leg injury and Officer 3 had received a head injury inside the bedroom. During the altercation, the bedroom was in total darkness. He denied committing or seeing anyone else commit any of the allegations.
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